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1 Introduction
This work presents two different distributed resource allocation algorithms where
peers control the service rate to its neighbours. The algorithms are based on the
congestion pricing principle known from IP networks and ensure some form of
fairness. Hence a peer gets a fair share of the resources available in the P2P
network weighted by its contribution to the network.
2 Peer-to-Peer Model
Consider a P2P network consisting of a set of peers P and a set of services S,
whereby each peer p is interested in one or several services and/or offers different
services. Thereby, providing a service consumes a scarce resource. We denote the
capacity of this resource at peer p as Cp.
To differentiate between service providing and service requesting peers in our
model we introduce the set of service providers SP and the set of service cus-
tomers SC. A peer is a member of SP or SC if it offers or requests at least
one service, respectively. One peer can be a member of both sets, which is the
predominant case in P2P networks.
Since each peer has only a partial view of the whole P2P network, a service
requesting peer is not aware of all peers that provide this service, and vice versa.
We define the set of peers, which offer at least one service to peer c, the service
customer, as the set of service providers SP(c) of peer c. The other way around
SC(p) is the set of the known service customers of the service providing peer p.
Suppose the utility of a service customer c is defined by a concave, strictly in-
creasing utility function U , which depends on the total service rate yc. Similar
to the rate control algorithm for IP networks we model the resource allocation
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in P2P networks as the optimisation problem
SYSTEM :
maximise
∑
c∈SC
Uc(yc) (1)
subject to
∑
p∈SP(c)
xpc = yc, ∀c ∈ SC (2)
∑
c∈SC(p)
xpc ≤ Cp, ∀p ∈ SP (3)
over xpc ≥ 0. (4)
Maximising the aggregated utility of the service rate yc over all service requesting
peers is the objective of the whole system. With a concave utility function this
optimisation problem has a unique optimum with respect to yc, although many
rate allocations may exist with respect to xpc, the rate between peer p and c.
3 Distributed Algorithm
To realise an implementation in a decentralised architecture we propose the
following system of differential equations, which depend on locally available in-
formation only:
RESOURCE PRICING (RP) :
Provider p :
d
dt
xpc(t) =γxpc(t)
(
λc(t)−
∑
d∈SC(p) xpd(t)λd(t)
Cp
)
(5)
Customer c :
λc(t) =
wc
yc(t)
=
wc∑
p∈SP(c) xpc(t)
, (6)
Here, λc and wc is the price per unit offered by customer c and the total
willingness-to-pay of c. It can be shown that the stable point of the distributed
algorithm coincides with the solution of the global optimisation problem [1]. The
total service rate in equilibrium is
yc =
wc
∑
p∈SP Cp∑
d∈SC wd
. (7)
Hence, the optimal resource allocation is weighted fair.
If signalling of a price is not possible in the network, a peer can only adjusts its
service rates based on the received service rates of the other peers. These rates
can be interpreted as the total price a peer pays for a service rate. Therefore,
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we can conclude the reciprocal rate control algorithm
RECIPROCAL RATE CONTROL (RRC) :
Peer p :
d
dt
xpc(t) = γ
(
xcp(t)− xpc(t)
∑
d∈SC(p) xdp(t)
Cp
)
(8)
4 Simulation Results
We present first simulation results for the two proposed algorithms for file dis-
semination networks like BitTorrent. Thereby, resource pricing is interpreted as
follows. A peer p acts as a service provider and a customer at the same time. It
provides its upload capacity Cp to the network. Additionally, its upload capacity
represents its contribution to the network. Therefore, the willingness-to-pay wp
is set to the upload capacity Cp. Each peer in the network adjusts its upload
rates to other peers with the proposed algorithm and simultaneously signals its
price offers to all peers it is interested in.
We compare the results of Resource Pricing (RP) and Reciprocal Rate Control
(RRC) with BitTorrent’s tit-for-tat (BT) strategy. When a new peer enters the
network it connects to a random subset of NR peers. Additionally, we assume
all peers are interested in each other except itself.
An example is depicted in Fig. 1 for Reciprocal Rate Control with NR = 2.
Results about the weighted fairness index (WFI) and average download rate are
shown in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, respectively. Additionally, Table 1 summarises the
BT RP RRC
NR = 2 0.6 0.987 0.992
NR = 5 0.857 0.997 0.992
NR = 10 0.888 0.997 0.979
Table 1. Averaged WFI for different upload strategies
results of the WFI for different scenarios. The results in the table are averaged
over 10 runs, whereby the 95% confidence interval is ±0.003 at most. All simu-
lations are run for 1000 peers entering the P2P network in the first second with
a small time offset.
For the simulations with a varying number of peers we model the peer behaviour
as a Poisson process, where the interarrival times between peers and the session
times of peers are exponentially distributed. Also the results for varying peer
populations in Fig. 4 and Table 2 indicate an improvement in fairness for the pro-
posed algorithms as compared to the tit-for-tat strategy of BitTorrent. Thereby,
Resource Pricing shows the best fairness lying near to the optimal allocation.
Further details about the proposed approach can be found in [1–3].
3
 P0 (C=2) 
 P6 (C=6) 
 0.2 / 0.2 
 P7 (C=7) 
 0.2 / 0.2 
 P23 (C=3) 
 0 / 0 
 P5 (C=2) 
 0 / 0.1 
 P16 (C=7) 
 0.2 / 0.2 
 P17 (C=9) 
 1.4 / 1.5 
 4.7 / 4.7 
 P9 (C=4) 
 1.1 / 1.1 
 0.4 / 0.4 
 P20 (C=7) 
 1.8 / 1.8 
 P24 (C=4) 
 0.3 / 0.3 
 0.1 / 0.1 
 P22 (C=5) 
 2.6 / 2.6 
 4.2 / 4.2 
 2.9 / 2.6 
 P1 (C=10) 
 P15 (C=8) 
 2.7 / 2.7 
 P3 (C=7) 
 5.1 / 5.1 
 P18 (C=6) 
 2.2 / 2.2 
 0.7 / 0.7 
 P11 (C=4) 
 1.9 / 1.9 
 0.1 / 0.1 
 0.3 / 0.3 
 P2 (C=7) 
 0.8 / 0.8  2.4 / 2.4 
 P21 (C=6) 
 2.3 / 2.3 
 P10 (C=2) 
 1.5 / 1.5 
 0.1 / 0.1 
 0.8 / 0.8 
 0.8 / 0.8 
 P14 (C=4) 
 0.1 / 0.1 
 P4 (C=5) 
 1.5 / 1.5 
 1.9 / 1.9 
 1.5 / 1.5 
 0.1 / 0.1 
 0.1 / 0.1 
 3.4 / 3.8 
 0.1 / 0.1 
 0.1 / 0.1 
 0.5 / 0.5 
 0.4 / 0.4 
 P13 (C=7) 
 1.5 / 1.5 
 P8 (C=1) 
 0 / 0 
 0.7 / 0.8 
 0.1 / 0.1 
 0.1 / 0.1 
 0.1 / 0.1  0.1 / 0.1 
 1.3 / 1.3 
 1.5 / 1.5 
 0.1 / 0.1 
 P19 (C=7) 
 2.6 / 2.6 
 P12 (C=8) 
 3.8 / 3.8 
 1.2 / 1.2 
 3.1 / 3.1 
 0.6 / 0.6 
 0.8 / 0.8 
Fig. 1. Unstructured P2P network of peers with heterogeneous capacities. Edges denote
a service between peers with a rate according to the edge label. Rates are computed
with the distributed algorithm Reciprocal Rate Control.
BT RP RRC
λ = 1 s, µ = 1000 s 0.696 0.977 0.946
λ = 10 s, µ = 1000 s 0.713 0.997 0.948
Table 2. Averaged WFI for varying peer populations (NR = 5)
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Fig. 2. Weighted Fairness Index of different upload strategies (NR = 5)
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Fig. 3. Comparison of average download rate and upload capacity
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Fig. 4. WFI for a varying peer population (λ = 1 s, µ = 1000 s, NR = 5)
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